Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12573/395

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  • Book Part
    Rule of Law, International Trade, and Corporate Financing Decisions in Europe: Evidence From the COVID-19 Pandemic
    (IGI Global, 2022-11-18) Polat, Ali Yavuz
    This chapter investigates whether the institutional environment that the firms operate has an impact on their leverage choice. Namely, rule of law is used as an institutional variable. Considering that better implementation of rule of law impacts positively firms' export performance, total exports in each country are also used as the other main explanatory variable. The findings show that both institutional variables and exports negatively and significantly affect the leverage level. This implies that firms in favorable institutional environment tend to borrow less, which results with lower leverage. Moreover, this study finds that the COVID-19 pandemic period as an unprecedented shock to economies pushed the leverage levels higher. Regarding the implications of the findings, firms' capacity to access external finance especially during a significant crisis period depends on the institutional environment. Namely, the effective implementation of rule of law should be first priority for the policy makers. © 2023 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
  • Article
    Citation - Scopus: 3
    Subprime Mortgages and Lending Bubbles
    (Bank Indonesia Institute, 2018) Polat, Ali Yavuz
    We consider a model with two types of households: the poor with no initial endowment and the rich with positive endowment, and two types of assets: properties in a poor area and properties in a rich area. In the model, poor agents need credit to buy an asset, whereas the rich can draw from their endowment. We show that credit-fueled housing bubbles sometimes may improve welfare, making the poorer individuals better off. More precisely, there exist two types of equilibria in both property markets: one is a bubble equilibrium, and the other is an equilibrium where asset prices are stable over time. While the poor always obtain a positive surplus in the bubble equilibrium, this is not necessarily true for the rich. Our results suggest that there may be scope for market interventions aimed at sustaining the value of assets held by credit-constrained agents after the burst of a credit bubble. © 2025 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.