Yönetim Bilimleri Fakültesi

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    Citation - Scopus: 2
    A Comparative Analysis of International and Domestic Acquisitions: What Drives Acquirer Competitiveness
    (Inderscience Publishers, 2018) Genç, Omer Faruk; Zakaria, Rimi; AGÜ, Yönetim Bilimleri Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü; Genc, Omer Faruk; 01. Abdullah Gül University
    Despite several decades of research in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), an understanding of acquirer competitiveness in international vis-à-vis domestic acquisitions remains inconclusive. This empirical study presents a comparative framework to identify a set of intangible factors that differentiate the long-term competitiveness of acquirers engaging in both of these types of acquisitions. Building on the information asymmetry logic, we find that access to accurate information, acquirers’ research and development (R&D) intensity, and similarity between the acquirer and the target play a vital role in determining the overall competitiveness of acquirers. Using a sample of all the M&As that occurred between 1985 and 2007 and applying a matching control methodology, sound comparisons are made to draw conclusions. From a theoretical standpoint, the findings help generalise the importance of intangible factors from the contextual, acquirer-centric, and dyadic angles. From a practical viewpoint, the conclusions enable managers to evaluate their firms’ preparedness for international vis-à-vis domestic acquisitions. © 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
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    Citation - Scopus: 3
    Subprime Mortgages and Lending Bubbles
    (Bank Indonesia Institute, 2018) Polat, Ali Yavuz; 0000-0001-5647-5310; AGÜ, Yönetim Bilimleri Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümü; Polat, Ali Yavuz; 01. Abdullah Gül University
    We consider a model with two types of households: the poor with no initial endowment and the rich with positive endowment, and two types of assets: properties in a poor area and properties in a rich area. In the model, poor agents need credit to buy an asset, whereas the rich can draw from their endowment. We show that credit-fueled housing bubbles sometimes may improve welfare, making the poorer individuals better off. More precisely, there exist two types of equilibria in both property markets: one is a bubble equilibrium, and the other is an equilibrium where asset prices are stable over time. While the poor always obtain a positive surplus in the bubble equilibrium, this is not necessarily true for the rich. Our results suggest that there may be scope for market interventions aimed at sustaining the value of assets held by credit-constrained agents after the burst of a credit bubble. © 2025 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.