

Tracing Trajectories of Regime Support in Turkey

Murat İNAN¹ 

ABSTRACT

According to the legitimacy approach of political culture research, public's approval of a particular regime as the best form of government and rejection of its alternatives provides public support for that particular regime. This research attempted to trace temporal trajectories of approval of democratic political system as well as its three alternative forms of government among the electorates of recent three major political parties in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). It also revealed the extent these parties' manifesto documents praise democratic political system across the successive eighteen general elections in the modern Turkish political history. It revealed the changes in both public and party support for four alternative regimes across years in modern Turkish history. This research analyzed the World Values Survey and the Manifesto Project data using quantitative research methods. It has achieved four main findings. First, voters are more stable than their parties across time in terms of pro-democracy. Second, democracy clearly emerges as the strongest alternative among the four alternative regimes for all the three electorates. Third, supporting democracy and rejecting its three alternatives occupy different places in the minds of the three party electorates. Fourth, changes in the three political parties' pro-democracy as identified in their manifesto documents are not always parallel with changes in those of their voters.

Keywords: Political regime, political culture, legitimacy approach, democracy, party politics.

JEL Classification Codes: D72.

INTRODUCTION

Political culture research has been instrumental to understand how particular cultural assets aid flourishing of particular political regimes. Students of this line of research aim to explain bottom-up mechanisms operating from societal culture to institutional structure. The main argument of the advocates of this line of research is that are compatible with the principles of a regime, the more entrenched that regime. Three approaches within the political culture research aim to explain this accord from different perspectives. They are; the legitimacy approach, the communitarian approach and the human development approach. These approaches suggest different sets of societal values and orientations that are thought to be important for entrenchment of a regime. The advocates of the legitimacy approach suggest that the public's overt legitimization of a particular regime and delegitimization of its alternatives support its establishment, entrenchment and survival. Expectedly, the application of this approach to the democratic political system is guided by the parameters that explain values intrinsic to democracy. Expectedly, it is suggested

by the advocates of the legitimacy approach that the greater public's overt approval of democracy as the best way of governing the country the greater the changes that democracy will survive (Weber 2002 [1904], Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 1965, 1975, Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Przeworski 1991, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994, Evans and Whitefield 1995, Mishler and Rose 1996, Klingemann 1999, Evans and Rose 2012, Bratton and Mattes 2001, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

The application of the legitimacy approach to democracy is not free of criticism though. These criticisms are mostly based on problems related to people's identification of democracy. Similarly, misidentification of the term may also be the case for institutions such as political parties. The most popular criticism is about the popularity of the term democracy. The critics argue that the public's overt approval of democracy as the best regime is not a good way of measuring its democracy level owing to the fact that democracy, by far, the most popular regime among its alternatives all over the world. Although the world societies' tendency to name democracy as the best way of governing their country is evident in almost all the countries of the world, the picture is absolutely different when it comes to their level of intrinsic democratic values.

¹ Abdullah Gül Üni., İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fak., Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Böl., 38080, Kayseri, Türkiye, murat.inan@agu.edu.tr

Another reason why the public's approval of democracy as the best regime is not a good way of measuring its genuine democratic level is that as democratic countries are mostly the economically developed ones, democracy as a term, most of the time, is used as synonymous to economic development instead of its authentic meaning (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Despite these criticisms targeting this approach's power to predict the public's genuine democracy level, understanding the level of the public's affirmation of democracy is still important. Understanding what different segments of the society — people of different generations, of different age groups, people supporting different political parties — may give us power to predict how much democratic ideals will be supported by the members of future generations or the electorates of future governments.

Departing from this perspective, the empirical aim of this research is thought to be threefold. The first aim is to follow three recently most popular political party electorates' trajectories of support for democracy across the time. The electorates of the three recent most popular political parties in Turkey, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP will be analyzed over the elections, that their parties took part in, in terms of their level of endorsement of democracy as the best administrative form of governing the country. The selection of these three parties first based on their vote shares and effect in Turkish politics. The AKP is governing party since 2002. Its executives tend to define themselves as a centrist, conservative, pro-democratic political party but it largely claimed to be a pro-Islamist one in academic circles. The CHP is the founder party of the modern Turkish Republic. It is a left-wing, modernist, pro-Western, pro-democratic political party which is frequently criticized by its opponents for being elitist. The MHP is a right wing political party which show great sensitivity to cultural degeneration and issues related to national security and high politics.

It is suggested both empirically and theoretically that the most effective way of analysing popular democratic support is to analyse it together with popular support for its alternative regimes (Klingemann 1999, Bratton and Mattes 2001). For this reason, this research will inquire three major political party electorates' countenance of democracy together with their endorsement of strong leader, expert rule and army rule as the most popular three alternatives of democracy of which there exist available empirical data. Owing to the global popularity of the term democracy, my first hypothesize is that Turkish society endorses democracy highly across the generations and across the electorates of the three political parties. Having mapped the historical course of the three party electorates' endorsement of democracy and its alternatives as the best way of governing Turkey, the following question may spring to the mind: Is it possible for a person or an overall political party electorate, owing to individual or party specific historical reasons, may be, to support at the same time both democracy and a regime which is suggested to be

it's alternative? This question naturally brings us to the second aim of the research, which will be to empirically explore whether these three allegedly alternative forms of democracy are genuinely alternatives of democracy in the minds of the three party electorates. Owing to a century long democratic experience in Turkey, my hypothesis is that democracy and its three alternatives emerge in distinct places in the minds of all the three electorates. People know and understand the differences between the four regime types and perhaps owing to Turkish greater experience with military coups, locate army rule to the furthest point to democracy. Following this, the research will move on with its third aim, which is to go beyond the scope of a descriptive show and arrive to a point where the legitimacy approach meets with party-voter congruence. As discussed above, the traditional interpretation of the legitimacy approach argues that the public's endorsement of a particular regime is important for that regime's survival. Yet, we know from the recent wave of protests for democracy from the Arab World to the Caucasia and to the Far East that the large gap between the public's desire for establishing a democratic political regime and that of the political parties governing the country may, on the contrary, end up with situations to the detriment of democracy. Keeping this in mind, it is plausible to argue that not only party bases' level of support for democracy, but also electorate-party accord on the desirability of a democratic regime is important for democratic progression. So far, only a few studies have investigated ideological accord between political parties and their supporters in Turkey in a systematic way (İnan 2020). Thereof, as the third aim, this research will explore the congruence between the three major political parties and their supporters by looking at the formers' pro-democratic pledges in their manifesto documents and the latter's pro-democratic inclinations. Matching party-level Manifesto Project data with party-level aggregated individual-level World Values Survey data in a causal fashion, this research will show us the extent of the party-electorate accord on the desirability of democracy and its three alternatives. This sort of a causal analysis will show whether Turkish political parties follow the trajectories of the public's approval of democracy and of its alternatives as the best regime while determining their pro-democratic stance. My expectation of this final analysis is to find results supporting the elitist theory of democracy. More frankly, I hypothesize that the political parties' pro-democracy levels are not necessarily determined by those of their supporters. The final set of findings is assumed to be useful to understand the representativeness of the democratic political parties in Turkey, which also, by extension, bespeaks to their political legitimacy.

Turkey constitutes an important case study to investigate democratic support because a research on Turkey will contribute to the discussions revolving around the question whether Islam is compatible with democracy. It will reveal whether voters and their parties in a country populated heavily by Muslims are compatible with democratic principles by showing important political parties' commitment to the democratic political system as well as their supporters' inclination towards democracy.

In order to accomplish the above-mentioned aims, this paper has been divided into five sections. The second section lays out the theoretical dimensions of the research. The third section introduces the data, the construction of the variables and the research strategy and methodology. The fourth section presents empirical findings. The final section discusses the empirical findings of the research in a broader theoretical perspective.

POLITICAL CULTURE RESEARCH AND THE LEGITIMACY APPROACH

All political regimes require public endorsement. It provides them legitimacy and power to govern. However, public endorsement is perhaps the most required for democratic regimes. This is simply because a democratic regime, different than all its alternatives, no ways can rely on brutal force to maintain its rule but on mere public support. Types of public support that a democratic regime can enjoy are diverse. People's interest in politics, their high participation level or their interest in taking part in voluntary organizations are known to be bolstering democratic political regimes. Beyond these, when looked from the political culture research's point of view, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal orientations, which are compatible with democratic norms and values, also provide support for a democratic political system. So far, a number of scholarly works following this line of research have provided a useful account of how cultural values and orientations such as popular support, trust and tolerance determine the destiny of democratic governments (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Weber 2002 [1904], Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994). In this causal picture drawn by the political culture researchers, the idea is that the more prevalent cultural assets compatible with democracy in a society, the more likely that a democratic regime will take root. At least three basic approaches have emerged within the political culture research, which suggest different types of values, and orientations that help entrenchment of a democratic regime. The first one is the human development approach, which suggests values such as tolerance and self-expression as the most important determinants of destiny of a democratic government. The second approach is the communitarian approach, which promotes the view that some orientations such as participating in politics and voluntary organizations and trusting fellow citizens are important for entrenchment of a democratic system. The third approach, the legitimacy approach, is different from the first two in that it does not

focus on societal values but interests in overt popular support for, in other words assessment, in the eyes of the public, of democracy as the best way of governing the country. Inglehart and Welzel's empirical findings suggest that the orientations associated with all the three approaches are distinct and correspond to different facets of democratic support (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Inan 2016).

DATA AND METHODS

Data

The final data were drawn from two separate datasets. They are the Manifesto Project and the World Values Survey. These two datasets are unprecedented to maintain the objectives of the research strategy adopted here. The party-level data was culled from the Manifesto Project, which codes the Turkish political parties' policy positions referring to their manifesto documents over elections. The individual-level data, on the other hand, which was then aggregated to the party level, was achieved from all the four legs of the Turkish Values Survey between 1996 and 2012.

The four variables were constructed using four items of the same battery-type question of the Turkish Values Survey. The question reads: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Following the question the following regime types are described as in the following.

- a. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- b. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.
- c. Having the army rule.
- d. Having a democratic political system.

Finally, four answer categories were provided for each statement: I) Very good, II) Fairly good, III) Fairly bad, IV) Very bad.

The variable was coded with whole numbers ranging from 1 to 4 and greater scores show greater support for the regime in question.

There are some matters with the individual level data that should be mentioned at this point. One matter is the under-representation problem of the older electorates and over-representation of the younger ones. The Turkish Values Surveys were conducted between the years 1990 and 2012. For that reason, the number of surviving electors of older elections is fewer than the number of surviving electors of newer elections which creates a bias against the representativeness of the older electors. Another problem,

which emerges owing to the time interval between the election time and the survey time, is related to electoral volatility. It is known that even in established democracies voter behaviors and preferences may change even in short time periods. In developing democracies, the voting volatility is even greater. When the length of the interval is considered the change in voting preferences is expected to be even larger.

The party-level democracy score was achieved from Manifesto data. The variable is a continuous one and greater numbers show greater level of pro-democratic notion in the manifesto document in the related party-election year dyad.

MEASURING PARTY-VOTER CONGRUENCE

In democracies, responsive political parties take their supporters' views into consideration while determining their policy positions. Thus, in democratic regimes, it is expected that a significant accord occur between the views of the parties and their supporters. This accord is called congruence. Congruence can simply be defined as the correspondence on opinions, values, orientations of the represented and the representative (Powell 2008). It is now a well established view that the greater the congruence between the public and its representatives the greater the level of democracy. Ideological congruence between parties and voters (Huber and Powell, 1994), between legislators and voters (Miller and Stokes 1963, Barnes and Farah 1972) or between governments and voters have been subject to considerable academic attention. In these studies finding the most representative point of the representatives and the represented constitutes the most important step of the research. Different researchers have applied different procedures in this regard. In general, while voter positions are estimated by using mass survey of the voters, party positions are estimated by either elite survey of the party executives, or voting positions of party legislators, or content analysis of the party manifestos. Benoit and Laver compared the left-right positions of the party electorates achieved from mass surveys with estimates of the same parties' left-right positions achieved from the content analysis of their manifestos on four policy dimensions (Benoit and Laver 2007). Castles and Mair (1984) used the results of the questionnaires asking experts, academics and journalists in different countries about parties' ideological positions on a 0-10 scale. Kim and Fording (1998) used party manifesto data compiled by Budge, Robertson, Heari, Klingemann and and Volkens, which was then updated by Volkens (1992). After this step, the most common procedure for measuring the level of party-voter congruence is simply to calculate the absolute distance between the policy positions of the representatives and the represented.

While finding the most representative ideological point of the representatives and the represented a researcher is to decide whether to take mean or median. Kim and Fording (1998) estimated the median voter position as the best representative point of voter ideology. Some

other previous studies have selected mean as the most representative position. The use of both procedures has weak and strong points. Using the mean as the most representative position of an electorate is appropriate while working with large-N data. However, mean gives greater weight to those voters whose substantial political positions are at the margins. Giving greater weight to any voter's influence creates a problem that a researcher studying democracy would not like to have since one of the principles of the democratic theory is that each voter's influence to the configuration of the political outcome is supposed to be equal. The median can be a good alternative to mean in equating each voter's influence, yet, it is not as effective as mean for finding the most representative point, since it provides numbers in integers only which in most cases causes loss of information. Nevertheless, for the large number of the cases and the small range of the variable that was introduced above, in this research mean was preferred to median (İnan 2020).

METHODS

Having introduced the data, now I can turn to introducing methods. To assess the relationships between independent and dependent variables a series of Multiple Linear Regression were used. To distinguish between different dimensions of pro-democratic support Explanatory Factor Analysis were used. Factor Loadings were used for the illustration of different dimensions on two-dimensional panel. Loading Plot and Bar Charts were used for the visualization of regime support (Field 2013).

FINDINGS

This section starts with providing descriptive statistics of the final dataset. Having the main features of the data presented then it turns to provide findings of the statistical analyses conducted. First, to develop a better understanding of our final dataset, let us take a close look at descriptive statistics for each variable.

Table 1 shows the three party electorates' aggregated legitimization level of four types of regime over all the elections their parties have joined since their foundation. For each battery item, the answer categories rank from 1 to 4, where 1 corresponds to "Very bad", 2 to "Fairly Bad", 3 to "Fairly Good" and 4 to "Very good" way of governing the country. On the right-most column the parties' democracy score for the election year is presented.

It is seen that from their foundation over the years the three party electorates' endorsement of these four alternative regimes have not changed considerably. Yet, this is not true for their parties' democracy score as shown on the right-most column of the table. The individual level trend is much easily seen in the Figure 1.

Table 2 reports the percentages of the answers given by the party electorates to the question inquiring their level of endorsement of four alternative regimes.

Table 1. Mean values for the three party electorates' endorsement of democracy and its alternative forms of government with parties' democracy scores by election years

Party Abbr.	Election year	Strong leader	Expert rule	Army rule	Democracy	Party democracy score
CHP	1950	2.35	2.39	2.10	3.46	0.80
CHP	1954	2.47	2.52	2.16	3.44	6.00
CHP	1957	2.39	2.45	2.01	3.47	5.40
CHP	1961	2.42	2.53	2.10	3.42	0.80
CHP	1965	2.52	2.54	2.00	3.44	0.20
CHP	1969	2.58	2.62	1.98	3.51	0.50
CHP	1973	2.56	2.61	1.93	3.51	4.80
CHP	1977	2.51	2.61	1.88	3.47	8.29
CHP	1983	2.50	2.62	1.90	3.49	-
CHP	1987	2.56	2.69	1.94	3.47	-
CHP	1991	2.58	2.73	1.96	3.48	-
CHP	1995	2.57	2.70	1.98	3.47	4.25
CHP	1999	2.59	2.75	2.05	3.47	2.58
CHP	2002	2.61	2.75	2.06	3.47	2.02
CHP	2007	2.59	2.75	2.09	3.45	0.74
CHP	2011	2.60	2.73	2.10	3.45	3.99
CHP	2015 (June)	2.60	2.73	2.11	3.44	9.60
CHP	2015 (Nov.)	2.60	2.73	2.11	3.44	11.07
CHP	2018	2.60	2.73	2.11	3.44	8.19
MHP	1961	2.71	2.46	2.17	3.71	13.82
MHP	1965	2.71	2.55	2.15	3.65	2.91
MHP	1969	2.58	2.58	2.09	3.52	4.31
MHP	1973	2.70	2.62	2.10	3.44	1.10
MHP	1977	2.78	2.67	2.17	3.38	1.10
MHP	1983	2.76	2.77	2.13	3.40	-
MHP	1987	2.75	2.77	2.10	3.38	-
MHP	1991	2.75	2.79	2.09	3.34	-
MHP	1995	2.79	2.78	2.09	3.34	10.48
MHP	1999	2.80	2.77	2.13	3.34	2.34
MHP	2002	2.80	2.79	2.13	3.32	10.13
MHP	2007	2.79	2.79	2.14	3.32	0.97
MHP	2011	2.79	2.79	2.14	3.32	2.60
MHP	2015 (June)	2.80	2.79	2.15	3.33	8.09
MHP	2015 (Nov.)	2.80	2.79	2.15	3.33	8.22
MHP	2018	2.80	2.79	2.15	3.33	15.14
AKP	2002	2.56	2.65	2.04	3.40	3.03
AKP	2007	2.58	2.64	2.05	3.41	1.60
AKP	2011	2.60	2.65	2.05	3.40	2.41
AKP	2015 (June)	2.60	2.65	2.05	3.39	6.19
AKP	2015 (Nov.)	2.60	2.65	2.05	3.39	6.16
AKP	2018	2.60	2.65	2.05	3.39	2.12

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996/2001/2007/2012, Manifesto Project 1950-2018.
 Number of Obs: 2.278 (WVS), 35 (Manifesto Project).




Figure 1. Public Support for Democracy and Its Alternative Forms of Government (For Three Party Constituencies, by Election Years)

Table 2. Percentage values for the three party electorates’ endorsement of democracy and its alternative forms of government

	Having a strong leader			Having experts make decisions			Having the army rule			Having a democratic political system		
	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP
Very Good	28	21	20	25	40	33	26	41	32	22	39	37
Fairly Good	37	36	37	28	36	35	24	36	38	29	36	34
Fairly Bad	19	21	23	24	35	40	29	36	34	25	28	45
Very Bad	14	19	18	19	40	42	26	32	34	30	34	34

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996/2001/2007/2012.
 Number of observations: 2,278

It seems that, when the election-aggregated data is nested on the party level, important significant differences emerge between party electorates’ levels of endorsement of different types of regimes. The AKP electorate seems to be the strongest supporter of having a strong leader as a very good/fairly good way of governing the country (65%). The CHP and MHP electorates seem to be almost equal in this regard. Expert rule is supported by the CHP electorate as very good/fairly good by far (76%) more than the other two party electorates. While in total 68% of the MHP electorates think having experts make decisions is very good/good way of governing the country,

this is 53% for the AKP supporters. For supporting the army rule as a very good and fairly good way of governing the country, the CHP electorate ranks the top by 77% and followed by the MHP and by the AKP electorates by 70% and 50% respectively. The final panel of the table shows party electorates support for a democratic political system. The same rank, which was observed in supporting the army rule, can be seen in supporting the democratic political system. While the percentage of the CHP voters who support the view that democracy is the best way of governing the country is 75%, this is 71% for the MHP and 51% for the AKP voters.




Figure 2. Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives as the Best form of Government by Party Electorates

Figure 2 shows the level of endorsement of each regime type for each party electorate. It is seen that democracy is, by far, the most popular regime for all the three electorates. Support for democracy seems to be 'something' between 'fairly good' and 'very good' way of governing the country for the all three party bases. Nevertheless, democracy's all the three alternatives including the army rule still seem to be not too unpopular. Among them while for the AKP and the CHP electorate expert rule and for the MHP electorate strong leader are the most popular regime types. To be able to understand where do these four regime types locate in the minds of the three party electorates a series of factor analyses were conducted.

Factor analysis in Table 3 and loading plots in Figure 3 show concomitantly that democracy sits on a completely different place in the minds of all the three party electorates than do all its three alternatives. This is shown by the scores they tap to the first factor in the table and by the physical distance between the plots in the figure. Among the three alternatives, army rule, also appears slightly far from strong leader and expert rule for the CHP and to a lesser extent for the MHP but not that far for the AKP as shown by the plot locations in the figure. Also, democracy seems to be closer in the minds of the CHP electorate to expert rule and strong leader than it is in the minds of the AKP and MHP electorate.

Having mapped the parties' as well as their electorates' level of support for four alternative regimes across the election years and understood that democracy and its alternatives occupy different spots of the minds of the three party electorates, now we turn to explore whether these four regime types are really viewed as alternative by the Turkish public. It is expected that having a strong leader, having experts make decisions and having the army rule variables to appear as significant and negative determinants of the variable of having a democratic political system. But, is this really the case? Our findings do not lend full support for this view.

Table 4 shows the results of a series of regression analyses attempted to investigate this matter. The results show to what extent the three party electorates' legitimization of democracy is effected by their delegitimization of its alternatives.

As can be seen from the table, Turkish respondents' understanding of the relationship between support for democracy and support for democracy's alternative regimes differs categorically according to their party affiliation. While the AKP and the MHP supporters view strong leader as a mirror concept of democracy as indicated with negative and significant relationships between the terms ($p=0.000$ and $p=0.013$ respectively), the CHP voters seem not to associate democracy with strong leader neither negatively nor positively ($p=.0.667$). This is perhaps the CHP voters' understanding of

Table 3. Factor analysis of forms of government for the three party electorates

Type of Government	AKP			CHP		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Having a strong leader	0.59	0.01	0.64	0.66	0.06	0.55
Having experts make decisions	0.60	0.10	0.61	0.63	0.16	0.56
Having the army rule	0.42	-0.10	0.80	0.40	-0.29	0.74
Having a democratic political system	-0.13	0.24	0.91	-0.07	0.39	0.83
Eigenvalue	0.92			1.01		

Type of Government	MHP			ALL		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Having a strong leader	0.61	0.06	0.61	0.61	0.06	0.61
Having experts make decisions	0.60	0.15	0.61	0.60	0.15	0.61
Having the army rule	0.40	-0.21	0.79	0.40	-0.21	0.79
Having a democratic political system	-0.14	0.32	0.87	-0.14	0.32	0.87
Eigenvalue	0.81			0.92		

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996/2001/2007/2012.

Number of observations: 2.278




Figure 3. Loading Plots of Four Government Types by Party Constituencies

Table 4. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models predicting individual level democratic support

	AKP	CHP	MHP	ALL
Strong Leader	-.10 (.02) ***	-.01 (.02)	-.07 (.03) *	-.07 (.01) ***
Expert Rule	.09 (.03)**	.10 (.03)**	.05 (.03)	.09 (.01)***
Army Rule	-.10 (.02) ***	-.18 (.02) ***	-.19 (.03) ***	-.15 (.01) ***
N. of Obs.	845	853	580	2.278
Adj. R. Sqr.	.0312	.0688	.0690	.0510

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996/2001/2007/2012, Manifesto Project 1950-2018.

Number of Obs: 2.278 (WVS), 35 (Manifesto Project).

Significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Note: Entries are coefficient scores with standard error values in parentheses.

Atatürk as a strong leader and having not much negative memories about the one-party CHP rule as much as the members of the other two parties. When the data for all the three party electorates are pooled the negative relationship between support for strong leader and for democracy remains significant ($p=0.000$). When the results related to the relationship between support for democracy and support for expert rule are observed, it is seen than for the AKP and the CHP electorates support for expert rule is a significant positive determinant of support for democracy ($p=0.004$ and $p=0.001$ respectively). There seems to exist a consensus between these two electorates in the view that support for expert rule is not to the detriment of support for democracy. This is not seen in the MHP electorate though ($p=0.194$). For the overall electorate there seems to be a positive and significant relationship between the two variables ($p=.000$) This finding can be related to the lack of a technocratic government memory in Turkish history and having an expert to rule the country may be understood as synonymous with having a qualified leaders which were still selected by means of democratic electoral processes. The third line of the regression analyses shows the relationship between support for democracy and support for the army rule. We observe a consensus between all the three party electorates here. It seems that all the three party electorates view army rule as a mirror term of democracy. The negative and strong significant relationship between support for democracy and support for army rule indicates that in the minds of the voters of the three political parties, democracy and army rule occupy opposite places. It seems that respondents in general who agree with the statement that democracy is the best regime type for Turkey are at the same time tend to disagree with the statement that army rule is the best regime form for governing the country. This is also likely for the respondents that have given opposite answers to the both questions. In other words, respondents who disagree with the statement that democracy is the best form of regime are inclined to disagree with the statement that army rule is the best regime form. This result is perhaps due to several military coups and coup attempts being held in the recent Turkish political history, which made army rule and democracy

two mutually-exclusive concepts in the minds of masses in Turkey.

Having observed the three party electorates' endorsement of the four regime types now let us look at democraticness of the parties the electorates said they would vote for if there were a national election tomorrow.

Figure 4 shows the three political parties' positive mentions in their manifesto documents since their foundation. The first thing that strikes the eye that the political parties are quite different than their voters in terms of the volatility of their commitment to democracy over the election years. It seems that all the three political parties' frequency of positive mentions of democracy in their manifesto documents fluctuates immensely throughout the time. Both the CHP and the MHP have come to 1960s with quite low democratic mentions however following the 1960 coup both parties democracy mentions went up. Yet, this trend did not last long and following the 1980 coup both parties and the new-born AKP's democracy mentions followed a modest trend until the democratization wave of the 2000s which was coupled by the EU membership and rapid democratization processes of the country.

Table 5 shows the results of a series of Linear Regression Analysis predicting party level democratic positions by aggregated individual level, support for strong leader, support for expert rule, support for army rule and support for a democratic political system. Before the interpretation of the results the small number of cases for the party-level data should be noticed. Having this noted, as one can see from the coefficient scores and standard error values, for none of the parties and also for the pooled data coming from all the three parties, party level aggregated individual level support for a strong leader, expert rule, army rule and democracy predict party level democracy scores statistically significantly. Yet, although the relationships were insignificant it should be noted that while strong leader variable has a positive sign for all the political parties, expert rule has negative for AKP and positive for the other two parties, army rule has negative signs for CHP and MHP and democracy has negative sign for AKP and CHP and positive sign for MHP.




Figure 4. Democratic Support Score in Party Manifestos (By Election Years)

Table 5. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models predicting party level democratic support

	AKP	CHP	MHP	ALL
Strong Leader	15.50 (82.77)	7.79 (41.23)	21.22 (56.75)	7.36 (9.48)
Expert Rule	-129.33 (458.38)	3.56 (29.10)	51.99 (61.67)	5.63 (11.12)
Army Rule	†	-6.98 (17.91)	-14.33 (88.08)	5.98 (12.32)
Democracy	-241.33 (270.33)	-45.13 (59.08)	54.09 (45.66)	9.53 (10.46)
N. of Obs.	6	16	13	35
Adj. R. Sqr.	-.2932	-.1862	-.2008	.0108

Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1996/2001/2007/2012.

Significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Note: Entries are coefficient scores with standard error values in parentheses.

†: Omitted due to multicollinearity.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

All the political regimes would enjoy being named by the people as the best way of governing the country. They would like to be known as the best fit policy producer to the problems related to the past, to today and to the future. Gaining people's endorsement provides all types of regimes legitimacy but especially the democratic ones. In democracies, different than in all the other regime types, political parties are ready to hand over rule in the event of being defeated by rival parties in the race of attracting public's vote support in the elections. Thus, losing the link with the people is the costliest so the desire for public's endorsement is the greatest in democratic regimes. The political culture research

focuses on the link between culture and institutions. Three approaches within the political culture research suggest three different sets of values that are thought to be breeding democracy. This research had focused on the legitimacy approach, which suggests the importance of overt public endorsement for a political regime for its survival. As suggested by the advocates of the legitimacy approach, this research have mapped public affirmation of democracy together with that of its most popular alternative regimes. Including army rule, expert rule and strong leader as alternatives of democracy to the analyses, this research has inquired popular countenance of four alternative regimes in Turkey by the three major political parties and their supporters.

This research had set three objectives. The first objective was to map three political parties' as well as their supporters' level of democratic support. The second objective was to explore whether three regime forms that are known to be alternatives of democracy really appear as alternatives in Turkish electorates' minds. The third objective was to match legitimacy approach with party-voter congruence by researching the extent of the party-voter accord on the attractiveness of democracy and unattractiveness of its alternative regimes. Investigating correspondence between the representatives of a political party and its voters is important because it directly has implications for the representativeness and the legitimacy of the party in question. This research has not claimed to encompass the entire party-voter congruence issue but provided an important insight to the particular topic of party-voter congruence on regime support in Turkey. For that reason, it is not possible to assess the whole party-voter congruence picture, which makes the generalizability of the findings of this research subject to certain limitations. Nevertheless, with findings of this research in hand we are now more able to assess the democratic journey of Turkish political parties.

Regarding to the first objective of the research, the first major finding suggests that Turkish electorates are a lot more stable in their level of endorsement of democracy when compared with the political parties they would vote for over election years. Moreover, Turkish electorates are not only stable in their high level of endorsement of democracy but also low level of endorsement of its alternative regimes. With these findings in hand, one can argue that democratic political system will continue to remain to be the most popular regime in Turkey.

The second major finding is that the level of confirmation of democracy as well as its alternatives as the best way of governing the country differ slightly from one party electorate to another. Democracy is by far the most endorsed regime for the AKP, the CHP and the MHP electorates. This is obviously good news for the future of democracy. Democracy is followed by the expert rule for the AKP and the CHP electorates and by strong leader for the MHP electorate. This finding can be explained by the Islamic emphasis on the principle of 'giving the job to the competent one' for the AKP and pro-bureaucratic stance of the CHP and authoritarian tendencies among the MHP electorates. Yet, obviously this interpretation requires further empirical examination. Finally, the most unwanted regime type is the army rule on which there seems to be strong accord across all the three party bases. Expectedly, this is due to the 1980 military government's policy to ban all the political parties following the coup which created an existential threat to democratic politics.

Following revealing the differences in degree in the endorsement of different regimes this research has then turned to revealing differences in kind. It was shown that having a strong leader, having experts make decisions and having the army rule appears as alternatives of having a democratic political system in the minds of all the three

electorates. Nevertheless, the distances between all the binary regime combinations differ slightly across party bases. Thus, the differences were better explained by means of causal analyses. Findings have suggested that the three party bases' understanding of the oppositeness of the four regimes is slightly different. For the AKP and the MHP electorates the endorsement of two out of three (strong leader and army rule) and for CHP one out of three (army rule) regime forms have emerged as significant and negative determinants of the endorsement of democracy. For the overall electorate this is strong leader and army rule. Sixty years of electoral democracy history together with anti-democratic interruptions by means of military coups seems to have thought well the overall Turkish electorate the mutually exclusiveness of the terms democracy and army rule.

The final major finding is that, although it should be noted that it was achieved by the analysis of a small number of cases generated by aggregating voter level data to party level for each election year, Turkish political parties do not seem to consider neither their electorates' level of endorsement of democracy nor their level of rejection of its alternative regimes while determining their pro-democratic stance.

Beyond these major findings there is one side finding that needs interpreting here. This interesting finding shades light to recent political discussions revolving around the party alignments the new presidential system has produced. Despite the People's Alliance formed by the AKP and the MHP and high vote permeability between these two parties, the similarity between the CHP and the MHP seems to be greater than the similarity between the AKP and MHP in terms of their support for these four alternative forms of government.

As the final word, these findings should be read carefully regarding to their implications for the legitimacy of the Turkish political parties and the future of democratic political system in Turkey as well as the prominent question of whether Islam is compatible with democracy.

REFERENCES

- Almond, G., & Verba, S., (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. *American Political Science Review*, 91(1), 66-81.
- Barnes, S. H., & Farah, B. (1972). National representatives and constituency attitudes in Germany and Italy. In *delivery at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American*
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2007). Estimating party policy positions: Comparing expert surveys and hand-coded content analysis. *Electoral Studies*, 26(1), 90-107.
- Blais, A., & Bodet, M. A. (2006). Does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policy makers?. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(10), 1243-1262.
- Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2001). Support for Democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental?. *British Journal of Political Science*, 447-474.
- Budge, I., & McDonald, M. D. (2007). Election and party system effects on policy representation: bringing time into a comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 26(1), 168-179.
- Castles, F. G., & Mair, P. (1984). Left-right political scales: Some 'expert' judgments. *European Journal of Political Research*, 12(1), 73-88.
- Dowling, J., & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior. *Pacific sociological review*, 18(1), 122-136.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*.
- Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British journal of political science*, 5(4), 435-457.
- Evans, G., & Rose, P. (2012). Understanding education's influence on support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Development Studies*, 48(4), 498-515.
- Evans, G., & Whitefield, S. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 485-514.
- Field, A. (2013). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*. sage.
- Golder, M., & Stramski, J. (2007, September). Ideological congruence and two visions of democracy. In *Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association*, Chicago.
- Golder, M., & Stramski, J. (2010). Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1), 90-106.
- Huber, J. D., & Powell Jr, G. B. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. *World Politics*, 291-326.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge University Press.
- İnan, M. (2016). *The Generational and Social Class Bases of Pro-Democratic Culture in Turkey: A Quantitative Analysis with WVS Data* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sheffield).
- İnan, M. (2020). Party-voter congruence in Turkish politics: the ivory tower argument tested. *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, 40(1), 97-117.
- İnan, M., & Grasso, M.T. (2017). A participatory generation? The generational and social class bases of political activism in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 18(1), 10-31.
- Kim, H., & Fording, R. C. (1998). Voter ideology in Western democracies, 1946-1989. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(1), 73-97.
- Klingemann, H. D. (1999). Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis. *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*, 31-56.
- McDonald, M. D., & Budge, I. (2005). *Elections, parties, democracy: Conferring the median mandate*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- McDonald, M. D., Mendes, S. M., & Budge, I. (2004). What are elections for? Conferring the median mandate. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-26.
- McDonald, M. D., Paskeviciute, A., Best, R., & Cremona, R. (2004). Out of equilibrium: a positive theory of parties and representation. In *meeting of the Public Choice Society*, Baltimore, MD.
- Mill, J. S. (1975). *On liberty* (1859).
- Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1963). Constituency influence in Congress. *American political science review*, 57(1), 45-56.

- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1996). Trajectories of fear and hope: support for democracy in post-communist Europe. *Comparative political studies*, 28(4), 553-581.
- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The concept of representation* (Vol. 75). Univ of California Press.
- Powell, G. B. (2006). Election laws and representative governments: Beyond votes and seats. *British Journal of Political Science*, 291-315.
- Powell, G. B. (2008). Changing Party System Polarization, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence. In annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Powell, G. B., & Powell Jr, G. B. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. Yale University Press.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton university press.
- Skinner, Q. (2005). Hobbes on representation. *European journal of philosophy*, 13(2), 155-184.
- Weber, M. (2002). *The Protestant ethic and the "spirit" of capitalism and other writings*. Penguin.

