Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20

Social mobility and pro-government mobilization: the case of July 15th pro-government mobilization in Turkey

Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd, Umut Türk & Rasim Özgür Dönmez

To cite this article: Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd, Umut Türk & Rasim Özgür Dönmez (2022) Social mobility and pro-government mobilization: the case of July 15th pro-government mobilization in Turkey, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 22:2, 281-304, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2021.2012887

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2021.2012887

SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES
2022, VOL. 22, NO. 2, 281–304
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2021.2012887

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Social mobility and pro-government mobilization: the case of July 15th pro-government mobilization in Turkey

Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd [a], Umut Türk [b] and Rasim Özgür Dönmez [c]

[a]Political Science and International Relations, Abdullah Gül University, Melikgazi/Kayseri, Turkey; [b]Economics Department Abdullah Gül University Kayseri Turkey; [c]Abdullah Gül University, Prof. Dr. Abant İzzet Baysal University/Abdullah Gül University

ABSTRACT

What are the economic determinants of pro-government mobilizations? While recent studies have contributed to our understanding of the relationship between a defined set of economic variables and political unrest – including revolts, riots, and uprisings against the status quo – there has been relatively little attempt to understand how these models might apply to demonstrations in support of the existing regime, which remain an understudied phenomenon within the literature. The coup attempt, which took place in Turkey on 15 July 2016 and was organized by a religious movement within the Turkish military, led to widespread public protests which ultimately succeeded in overcoming the threat. This case affords us a valuable opportunity to study the phenomenon of pro-government mobilization and its political and economic underpinnings. By applying the theoretical contributions of the already well-established literature on social mobility, we argue that higher earnings, economic equality and social mobility will foster a greater likelihood of mass mobilizations in support of the regime. Our study contributes to the literature theoretically by extending the scope of the existing theories on mass mobilization and empirically by examining a rare case of pro-government mobilization in Turkey by using individual and regional level datasets.

KEYWORDS

Pro-government mobilization; Turkey; multilevel models; social mobility; protests

1. Introduction

On the night of 15 July 2016, the AKP government in Turkey faced a coup attempt allegedly orchestrated by a prominent religious movement and its followers in the military, led by a US-based cleric named Fethullah Gülen. The abortive coup caught everyone by surprise, but perhaps even more surprising was the outpouring of popular resistance. Supporters of the government flocked to the streets at the invitation of President Erdoğan. The mobilization of the masses in defence of the existing regime and against the country's armed forces was a rare event, not only for Turkey but also from the perspective of world political history, and there have been relatively few studies concerning the motivations of those involved in such large-scale pro-government mobilizations (Susánszky et al. 2016; Rashiduzzaman 1997; Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020; Smyth et al. 2013). Pro-government mobilizations (PGMs) can be defined as popular

CONTACT Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd armagan.tekelloyd@agu.edu.tr Abdullah Gül University, Barbaros Mah. Erkilet Cad. İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi Kocasinan Kayseri, Melikgazi/Kayseri, Turkey

demonstrations, sometimes involving violent clashes with the opposition and sometimes limited to more peaceful actions to protect the existing regime. These are often associated with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, rather than well-established democracies, and this can be the reason why participants in PGMs are commonly depicted as 'manipulated' subjects, who are coerced into defending the system by leaders whose aim is to consolidate their own power (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020). The view of those who took part in the demonstrations of 15 July as 'manipulated' supporters of Erdoğan has likewise been fairly widespread (Miş 2016). This study aims to contribute to the literature on PGMs and challenge the prevailing notion that PGM actors are somehow coerced. Instead, we emphasize the importance of regional characteristics and, in particular, the 'social mobility' profile of regions as a means of explaining PGMs and the individual motivations of the participants. Although this focus upon social mobility has gained increasing prominence within the literature on political behaviour in recent years, there has been little attempt to apply these insights to the specific case of PGMs. In the particular case of 15 July, few studies have exclusively focused on the ideological and leadership dimensions that explain the mobilization (Miş, 2016 ; Ünver and Alassaad, 2016.; Dönmez, Timur and Lloyd,2020). For instance, Miş (2016) successfully documented that ideological convictions around nationalism and Islam were significant factors in the July 15th protests, and these were evident in the chanting and slogans of the protestors. However, our analysis does not invalidate any of these arguments but aims to underline the importance of socio-economic factors -particularly social mobility- that potentially explain this rare phenomenon.

This article analyses whether regional differences in social mobility can explain individuals' decision to participate in PGMs. As in previous studies on the relationship between social mobility and various political events (such as political unrest), our measure of social mobility is at the regional level. This is, in part, due to data restrictions but also due to a purposeful choice. As documented in the literature, upward social mobility -at the regional scale- correlates with several regional socio-economic factors such as social capital, better institutions, stability and job accessibility (Chetty et al. 2014). This means that by employing regional scale social mobility, we can also test other regional determinants that are potentially relevant to the study of PGMs. Moreover, while the few studies on PGM have undertaken cross-country comparisons by country-level indicators, this paper proposes a new method for measuring the likelihood of mobilization where both individual-level variables such as gender, age and income and regional level determinants such as inequality, unemployment and social mobility are employed in a multilevel logistic model.

Political economic factors such as social mobility have rarely been cited within the literature as relevant to the phenomenon of PGM, and we believe that there are two reasons for this apparent oversight. Firstly, PGMs are rare, and the existing examples in the literature are all drawn from semi-authoritarian regimes. The English-speaking scholarly world is more familiar with anti-government protests. Research concerning third world semi-authoritarian governments tends to focus on destructive events such as civil wars, political unrest, and mass protests. According to Linz (2000: 165), the lack of attention paid to the phenomenon of PGMs is because, within the Western world, authoritarian governments are thought to lack an all-encompassing ideology that would nurture a high level of mobilization on the part of the citizenry. The masses

within such regimes are assumed to be controlled; therefore, popular mobilizations in favour of governments are easily dismissed (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012; I Miquel 2007; Geddes and Zaller 1989).

The second reason for the lack of attention paid to 'social mobility' in this context has been the overwhelming state-centrism inherent in PGM literature. State-centric studies acknowledge the presence of PGM in semi-authoritarian governments. Still, because they conceive of the ruling strategy of these governments primarily in terms of manipulation and coercion (Geddes and Zaller, 1989), they tend to see PGMs as centrally orchestrated by the state. For example, Hellmeier and Weidmann (2020 examine PGM data from 2013–2016 in semi-authoritarian governments using a multi-regression model. They argue that these were overwhelmingly deployed by the government itself to deter coup attempts, anti-government mobilizations, or to alter the political agenda in that country. The state is thought to exercise absolute power over 'resource mobilization' as a means of organizing, controlling and guiding protestors in the field (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). For example, in their study of PGMs in Russia, Smyth et al. (2013) argue that in the 2000s, Kremlin itself has established state-dependent civil society organizations to obstruct '*Colour Revolutions*' in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Regional social mobility does not appear as a determinant of PGMs in this literature because the provision of economic welfare is assumed to be largely irrelevant to the political strategy of semi-authoritarian governments. The participants' economic motives or material interests are underestimated because they are perceived as indoctrinated or otherwise compelled to participate in mass rallies by the state.

In seeking to reverse this trend, recent studies conducted by Acemoğlu and Robinson (2001), Houle (2019), Leventoğlu (2014), Rosendorff (2001) and Benabou and Ok (2001) have incorporated social mobility as a key determinant underlying economic and political choices both within authoritarian and democratic governments, although they have not applied this research to PGMs explicitly.

A PGM can be interpreted as an attempt to protect the existing status-quo, current levels of income or social mobility and a rejection of any transition to a future 'unknown' regime. By utilizing individual and regional level data from Turkey in a multilevel modelling framework, we will test a series of hypotheses derived from existing studies of regional social mobility and regime support. Firstly, we seek to determine whether individuals who attained a higher level of income under the current regime would also anticipate better economic conditions in the future and hence be more likely to participate in a PGM. Secondly, by using a similar approach to Houle (2019), we attempt to ascertain whether those individuals who live in high social mobility regions would be more inclined to participate in a PGM in support of the existing regime out of some sense of loyalty to the government. Due to the greater economic volatility in Turkey, class positions are less fixed. This means that just as upward mobility may serve to shore up support for the existing status quo, the fear of downward mobility in an uncertain future may further incentivize individuals to participate in PGMs. Although our study is explicitly focused on Turkey, particularly the experience under the AKP rule, we hope that this study will enable other researchers to engage more effectively with the specific material and individual motivations that underlie the phenomenon of PGMs in different contexts.

2. Social mobility and PGMs

The importance of social mobility in shaping the political attitudes and decisions of the citizenry is well-recognized in the literature. Social mobility is a measure of an individual's opportunity to move along the social strata at different points in time and is more closely related to perceptions of fairness than other existing measures of inequality such as income or unemployment (Day and Fiske 2017; Benabou and Ok 2001; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2001). At the aggregate levels, social mobility represents resources and opportunities offered on a regional level, which increases the likelihood of improving residents' social status or earnings. In this respect, regional social mobility is related to conventional politics in many ways and is often deemed to be a major factor in determining popular support for regime change or regime support in authoritarian governments (Leventoğlu 2014; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2006). It is also helpful as a means of predicting attitudes towards redistributive policies, as it is argued that if people have a reasonable expectation of downward mobility in the future, they are more likely to be supportive of governments that champion a more egalitarian income distribution scheme (Piketty 2005; Benabou and Ok 2001). Therefore, social mobility is often directly related to voting behaviour, determining whether the voters will lean towards the right or left-wing parties (Barber 1970; Weakliem 1992; De Graaf et al. 1995).

The study of social mobility has been afforded special attention, particularly in the anti-government protest literature (Jones 1998). Malik and Awadallah (2013), for example, find that unemployment and lack of social mobility were the main factors underlying the mass protests in Egypt during the Arab Spring, which resulted in the fall of the Mubarak regime. Bai and Jia (2016) lend further support to this basic thesis, arguing that the lack of mobility played a crucial role in inciting the Chinese Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Qing dynasty. They point out that, following the abolition of the civil exam system in 1905, commoners had little prospect of moving up the social ladder, which ultimately led them to overthrow the system. Conversely, Tobin (2012) argues that the Arab Spring did not occur in Jordan precisely because the lower classes still enjoyed a measure of upward social mobility. Members of the urban poor and the working classes in East Amman were able to procure jobs in the more cosmopolitan and wealthier area of West Amman, particularly in the service sector, and thereby gain entry to the new middle classes, preventing them from becoming politicized as anti-system dissidents.

Social mobility has relevance in explaining PGMs, although this relationship has thus far not been studied extensively. Rather, there have been intimations of its importance primarily in the works of Acemoğlu and Robinson (2001) and Leventoğlu (2014) (2005, 2013), who examine social mobility as a determinant of class-based political support for authoritarian regimes. Adapting the theory of political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, they underline the material basis for pro-government or anti-government support, crediting the citizenry with the capacity to follow rational motives despite their exposure to intense propaganda and the state-run media (Del Sordi 2018). Rationality means here that humans are always capable of choosing the best outcome for themselves, but rather that they are aware of the material outcomes of their choices and carefully consider their interests when making decisions

(Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2001). They deliberate on how much their economic conditions have improved compared to the past and to others under the current regime 'now', and, if they expect this to continue in the 'future', they are more likely to support the government.

Focusing on social mobility would augment the few existing studies of PGMs, which have overwhelmingly emphasized psychosociological and personality traits rather than economic factors as important determinants of people's participation in PGMs. For example, Greene and Robertson (2017) draw a link between personality traits and support for political regimes, arguing that characteristics such as 'agreeableness' are important in explaining an individual's participation in PGMs in authoritarian settings. A study by Susánszky et al. (2016) similarly argues that sociopolitical factors such as civic virtue and national loyalty help to account for popular participation in mass mobilizations in Hungary (see also Smythet al. 2013). The lack of focus on economic variables such as income or social mobility in these studies may be attributable to the widespread notion that authoritarian governments owe their power and stability to coercive strategies alone (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2019; Del Sordi 2018; Gray 2003). Our argument, in contrast, follows the comparative literature on semi-authoritarian governments, which argues that they may also seek to legitimize their rule through economic appeals, securing the loyalty of their citizens by satisfying their material needs (Del Sordi 2018, 218; Baharoğlu 2005, 2013; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2001). In other words, as Geddes (2000) argues, an authoritarian regime stays stable as long as its political elite manages the economy well.

The relationship between social mobility and PGMs in semi-authoritarian governments can be observed on several levels. Firstly, higher income can itself be a critical determinant for the emergence of pro-government rallies, particularly when the government is threatened by a coup or revolution. According to Houle (2019), income increase is an indicator of absolute social mobility, which, in turn, is a measure of the degree to which an individual's income increases or decreases between different points in time. As Parvin (1973, 273) argues, an income group could be expected to react unfavourably to any threat to, or an actual decrease in, the ongoing commodity flow to that group. Parvin has also asserted that increasing income levels might encourage popular support for the government even in other countervailing factors such as economic inequality. Finkel et al. (1989) further suggest that this increase in income does not need to be persistent to secure support for a given regime. Evidence from Costa Rica and West Germany indicates that even amid an economic downturn or crisis, past experience with increasing incomes will encourage citizens to maintain their support for the regime.

Accordingly, if citizens enjoy an increase in their income under a particular regime type and experience upward social mobility as a result, they will be less inclined to support regime change. As we have already argued, many semi-authoritarian governments rely upon economic growth as a political strategy for securing the support of the masses. Therefore, regime change, which would entail an uncertain economic future and a possible interruption in the growth and prosperity enjoyed under the existing status quo, could lead many to participate in PGMs. Our hypothesis is in line with the arguments of Leventoğlu (2014) and Acemoğlu and Robinson (2001). They have demonstrated that higher incomes, which have sometimes resulted from good economic

performance of semi-authoritarian governments, might help forestall rebellions and coups by allowing for the emergence of a cross-class alliance. By the same logic, we might expect to see the emergence of such a cross-class alliance in the context of PGMs.

Secondly, we argue that aside from absolute income, people's social mobility under an authoritarian regime could also encourage their participation in PGMs. Semi-authoritarian governments often rely upon a system of economic distribution based upon patrimonial ties to provide welfare to their own socio-economic base and shelter them from periodic economic crises. Coups, however, can transform the basic relations of power between social classes established under an authoritarian regime, enabling previously marginalized classes to increase their status in the social hierarchy (Houle 2019). Examples of such redistribution occurring in the aftermath of a coup are quite common – for instance, in Chile following the overthrow of Salvador Allende's government in 1973; in Argentina following the 1980 coup; and, more recently, in Egypt throughout the upheavals of the Arab Spring (Baharoğlu 2005). This prospect of economic reshuffling increases the costs associated with regime change for those who are already beneficiaries of the system and decreases the cost of mobilization in favour of the regime. This is particularly the case if the protesters are aware that their actions will be excused or endorsed by the government even if they involve violence.

This argument concerning social mobility and its significance for PGM is in line with the findings of the regime protection literature more broadly. In her game-theoretic model of regime stability under authoritarian governments, Leventoğlu (2014, 17; 2005) has outlined the various strategies available to rich and poor segments of society depending upon their mobility levels. She argues that, in the presence of social mobility, the poorer classes will be less likely to collaborate with those seeking to topple the existing government, and the likelihood of mass protests or widespread support for a coup will be commensurately lower. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2001) have made a similar point concerning the middle classes, arguing that so long as they continue to experience upward social mobility, they will be less inclined to concern themselves with other social and economic factors such as the repressiveness of the regime or existing income inequalities in the society. Therefore, as Houle (2019) concludes, social mobility motivates individuals from differing social classes to maintain the status quo and oppose any political action that might imply a loss of their expectations for future social mobility (see also Roe and Siegel 2011). We would further add that social mobility can also motivate individuals to participate in PGMs for the same reason. Moreover, in developing countries with semi-authoritarian governments, class structures are more volatile, meaning that transition from one class to another can be much easier. As Ansell and Samuels (2010) have argued, this volatility might actually encourage participation in PGMs since, even during turbulent periods such as in an economic crisis which could provide the catalyst for anti-government protests, supporters of the regime would enjoy greater protection and be highly motivated to protect their social position.

3. The background: social mobility under AKP

The AKP's rise to power in 2002, which altered the destiny of hitherto unsuccessful Islamic parties, resulted from the general dissatisfaction with the previous coalition government (Öniş 2012). The AKP received 34% of the popular vote in its first election

and in the ensuing years, it continuously increased its share of the vote and monopolized governmental power and authority leading up to the present. During the last two decades of AKP rule, Turkey enjoyed an average economic growth rate of three percent between 2000–2012, despite the global financial crisis in 2008 (Öniş 2012). Although some have objected that, in comparison with other middle-income countries, Turkey's growth rates and economic success were only modest (World Bank 2014). Nevertheless, to a certain extent thanks to its economic performance, the AKP increased its share of the vote from 34% in its first election to 49% in 2011. AKP represented itself as a moderate Islamist party but displayed strong adherence to neo-liberal globalization. On the one hand, it sought the support of the low-middle classes both economically and socially by promising to carry them from the periphery to the centre of politics against secular masses and on the other hand, it appealed to the Islamic capital owners to redistribute the wealth from seculars to them by supporting their businesses investment and trade (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009; Bozkurt 2013).

Although initially, the AKP's appeal to religion might have been its main selling point from the perspective of the larger population, its continued success has been primarily a function of its provisioning of economic growth, the overall rise in income and its impact on social mobility, helping to establish its hegemonic rule both in the urban and rural areas of the country. The AKP's economic performance can be roughly divided into two periods. Despite the decrease in its growth rate from seven percent to three percent during the economic crises of 2008 (Bahçe and Köse 2017), Turkey demonstrated a quick recovery, enjoying high growth rates again until the coup. During the AKP period, Turkey has experienced solid economic performance, which has been instrumental in lifting many out of poverty. From 2002 to 2015, the share of the population who earned $5.50 per day declined from 35% to 11.5%, and the median income earned by the second and third quintiles of the income distribution has increased (World Bank 2015). This means that, in addition to the decrease in poverty, middle income has also expanded. Therefore, the AKP government has shown a significant commitment to the redistribution of income generally, and the economic growth under AKP rule has been widely distributed throughout society. The fact that this growth was overwhelmingly spurred by cheap credit has led more recently to the destabilization of the Turkish Lira and rampant inflation throughout the country, with evident negative repercussions for many. Nonetheless, the fact that the AKP benefited politically from this credit-fuelled growth model over the past two decades has likely made it reluctant to abandon this. If anything, the post-COVID economic expansion will further reinforce the political utility of this approach in the minds of policymakers.

In addition to the positive performance of certain economic indicators under the AKP rule, both upper-middle and lower-middle classes enjoyed heightened upward social mobility. In terms of its economic policies, the AKP is best characterized as 'neo-liberal' with patrimonial ties to the sections of capital that identify themselves as religiously conservative. Under the expansionist policies of the AKP, entrepreneurs, self-employed tradespeople, and small manufacturing companies located both in the metropolitan and Anatolian cities have enjoyed considerable economic gain. In this regard, it is also important to emphasize the importance of the Gülen movement to the AKP's economic success. The Gülen movement has provided the rising small and mid-sized Anatolian capital access to international trade networks abroad through its organization under

TUSKON (Turkiye Businessmen and Industrialists Confederation) (White 2012; Gülalp 2004). In fact, the AKP has drawn its support and legitimacy not only from the poorest of the poor but more crucially from this upward mobile lower-middle classes. The small-medium size manufacturers and international trading companies have increased their income considerably during the AKP rule, and expectations of further growth ('perceived social mobility') continued to fuel their support for the regime.

Besides increasing patronage to the already established Islamic middle classes, the AKP's policies also created a 'New Middle Class' by raising the standard of living, consumption and upward social mobility among the lower-income quantile. The AKP has committed itself to the provisioning of 'social security' to the public through different organizations, including more centralized institutions such as *Sosyal Yardimlasma ve Dayanismayi Tesvik Fonu* (Fund for Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity), municipalities and *vakifs* (charities). Significant -in-kind support, including groceries, coal, and clothing, are distributed to poor neighbourhoods (Bozkurt 2013). In addition to delivering such services, the AKP also instituted social policies, such as new regulations in the health care system and increased welfare support to families with disabled members. Access to education has been facilitated for a greater number of people from the poor segments, thanks to the proliferation of universities from 52 to 202 since 1992 (Kurumu 2019). Although criticized by some for fostering dependencies on the state, welfare policies have increased the trust vested in the political elite by large segments of the population.

Although the AKP's economic policies have been a qualified success from the standpoint of a developing country, the political landscape has deteriorated sharply beginning in 2011. Under AKP rule, ideological polarization between secular and religious groups vastly increased. In the social arena, the AKP also raised suspicions on the part of many regarding its dedication to Turkey's EU membership bid and its pro-democratic reforms (Çınar 2018). In 2010, after winning the Constitutional Referendum, the AKP was criticized for increasing its control over the judiciary and eliminating opposition to its political programme by altering the justice system to its own advantage. In the meantime, the AKP president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was denounced as an authoritarian figure by most opposition groups. The opposition towards the government's perceived authoritarianism and conservatism culminated in the Gezi Park protests of 2013 – the largest anti-government protests in Turkey's recent history – as a result of which polarization in Turkey's political spectrum between AKP supporters and opposition groups has significantly deepened.

The Gezi movement was the first occasion on which the AKP leader talked about the possibility of the masses mobilizing in his support and fight against the protestors, but the occasion for the pro-government mobilization emerged during the coup attempt in 2016 organized by the Gülen supporters. Although long-term allies, AKP and the Gülen movement have been falling apart since 2012 due to the issues revolving around the share of authority in the state. The AKP government declared that it was an extension of this Gülen movement within the military that conspired to the coup attempt against the government in 2016. However, the civilian population of Turkey, which took to the streets in nearly every city, was ultimately successful in thwarting the attempt – in some cases by simply being in the streets, in others, by speaking with and convincing the young soldiers who were under the command of their generals, and in others, by the violent

armed struggle against the military. On the night of 15 July 2016, Turkey witnessed the largest and most significant pro-system mobilization in the country's modern political history.

4. Data and methods

In this section, we introduce the data used in our analysis and elaborate upon our investigation method.

4.1 Data

In order to test our hypothesis on the relationship between social mobility and PGM, we rely upon two individual-level datasets. The prime dataset is derived from a face-to-face survey conducted by Konda Research and Consultancy Agency (KONDA, Reserach and Consultancey Agency 2016) three weeks after the coup attempt. The KONDA survey is used to model individuals who attended the July 15th protests and their demographic and socio-economic characteristics precisely. The second dataset is the panel data Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) provided by TURKSTAT (Turkish Statistical Institute) for the 2006–2016 period. SILC is used to construct the social mobility vector as the variable of interest and is assembled on a regional level by aggregating income mobility measures from the individual level information (see Chetty et al. 2014; Michelangeli and Türk 2021 for similar approaches).

The KONDA survey included 2676 interviewees and was representative at the regional level (NUTS1 12 regions).[1] We can identify the individuals who attended the 15 July protests against the coup from the data survey. The dependent variable is constructed in such a way as to determine the likelihood of PGM during the night of the coup attempt. In the days following the coup attempt, the government called upon individuals to attend so-called 'democracy watch' gatherings organized to counteract the threat of a new coup and were held in the central squares of major cities. Respondents of the survey specified whether they had attended these gatherings. We model the likelihood of participation in the 'democracy watch' gatherings as the dependent variable in alternative models when conducting our sensitivity analysis along with other robustness checks as described in section 5.3. The coup attempt started in the evening, and President Erdoğan called the public to the squares of the cities at midnight. In this respect, people could attend PGMs in towns and metropolitan areas without any limitations of occupation type (as the coup attempt did not coincide with working hours). However, rural residents would have difficulty mobilizing since they might have had restrictions regarding transportation. Therefore, we only consider the respondents who resided in cities or metropolitan areas (99% of the sample). The same holds for 'democracy watch' gatherings.

The KONDA data consists of variables describing individuals' socio-demographic and economic status, political orientation, and region of residence. Table 1 lists the variables included in the models and descriptive statistics: income is a continuous variable and indicates the monthly income of the respondents. In the model, we use the natural logarithm of income. The variable *Male* is a dummy assuming the value 2 for male respondents and 1 for females. *Age* is a continuous variable and ranges from 17–97. The variable *Education* indicates the highest educational level attained under three categories:

Table 1. The list of variables used in analyses and Summary Statistics.

Variable List	Mean	Standard Deviation	Definition
Mobilized	0.44	0.49	Dummy variable denoting individuals who participated in the PGM on July 15th.
Gender	1.53	0.49	Dummy variable 2 = Males 1 = Females
Income	7.597	0.551	Natural Logarithm of monthly income level of respondents in 2015
Education	1.592	0.73	Categorical variable 0 = Below high school, 1 = High School, 2 = At least university
Lifestyle	1.98	0.72	Categorical variable 1 = Modern 2 = Traditional conservative, 3 = Religious conservative
Ethnicity	1.39	0.91	Categorical variable 1 = Turks, 2 = Kurds, 3 = Arabs
Occupation	3.00	1.43	Categorical variable 1 = Unemployed 2 = Executive, 3 = Self-Employed, Worker, 4 = Retired, 5 = Housewife, 6 = Student
Political Party	2.66	2.14	Categorical variable 1 = opted out, 2 = AKP, 3 = CHP, 4 = MHP, 5 = HDP, Undecided
Expectations	1.49	0.50	Expectations about future economic conditions. Categorical variable 1 = expects positive changes, 2 = no changes, 3 = expects negative changes
Social Mobility	0.36	0.12	Intra-generational social mobility measured by rank-rank slope coefficient and decomposed to the regional level.
Social Mobility 2	0.45	0.10	Intra-generational social mobility measured by Kendall's tau-b and decomposed to the regional level.
Gini	0.43	0.017	Gini index of income inequality per region.
Regions	4.81	3.30	12 regions of Turkey.

those who studied up to high school, those with a high school degree and those with at least a university degree. Interviewees were also asked to categorize their lifestyle by choosing one of the three: modern, traditional conservative or religious conservative. The variable *lifestyle* is included in the model with these three categories. *Ethnicity* is a nominal variable including the Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic identities of the respondents. Finally, the respondents reported the party they voted for in the elections prior to July 15th. The variable *Political Party* contains six categories for the four major parties, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP, *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* – HDP, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – MHP, eligible voters who opted out and undecided voters.

Our analysis focuses on how the social mobility profile of Turkish regions is associated with the likelihood of PGM occurring. To measure social mobility, we use the panel data SILC for the period 2006–2016[2]. SILC is designed as a questionnaire and consists of such variables as gender, age, occupation, and yearly income. We are interested in the evolution of incomes across years (four-year intervals for the same respondents) to show the social mobility dynamics and regional heterogeneity in intra-generational social mobility.

Our measures of social mobility are at the regional level, as in previous studies cited above. However, this limits our interpretation of the relationship between PGM and social mobility, making causal arguments harder to build. In the sensitivity analysis, we attempt to construct and add an individual level and subjective social mobility measure to the multilevel model. The KONDA survey asked respondents about their expectations regarding their economic status in the future. We have constructed a categorical variable

which takes the value 1 if respondents have a positive and optimistic view, 2 if they do not expect a change and 3 if they have negative and pessimistic expectations about the future economic conditions.

For the regional controls, we include the Gini index of income inequality at the regional level, which is computed from SILC. Finally, we add GDP per capita, unemployment rates and population density at the regional level to the model (TurkStat 2016). Social mobility is a proxy for how residents in a given region are likely to experience upward social mobility, and GDP per capita is a measure of the well-being in the regions themselves. The variable *Gini* is a measure of inequality at the regional scale and varies between 0 and 1, where 0 is the theoretical minimum of perfect equality, and 1 is perfect inequality. Finally, the variable *Population density* controls for the agglomeration effects.

4.2 Methods

We first need to compute intra-generational social mobility as our variable of interest. The existing literature offers numerous measures of social mobility (see Solon 1999 for a review). We utilize two simple measures: the first is a relative mobility score derived from the intergenerational social mobility literature, which computes the association between the income ranks of people in two different periods. Income ranks show the percentile position of a person in a given year's income distribution and are more stable with respect to the logarithm of incomes (Chetty et al. 2014). Moreover, relative mobility is less sensitive to inequality in income distribution and other macro variables, allowing us to examine several economic variables in our model.

The rank-rank slope is obtained by regressing the position of people in the income distribution over their position in the previous income distribution as follows:

$$r_{it} = \alpha + \beta r_{it-1} + \varepsilon_i \qquad \text{(Eq.1)}$$

where r_{it} is the income of rank individual i at time t and r_{it-1} income rank in the previous period. β is a rank-rank slope and shows how much $i's$ position in the income distribution is dependent on the previous years. The higher the coefficient, the less social mobility. We take 1-β as our measure of relative social mobility. The index measures the likelihood that individuals will find themselves in different ranks in the income distribution at different periods in time.

The second social mobility indicator is a nonparametric measure known as the Kendall rank correlation coefficient (Kendall's tau-b). This measure can estimate the strength and the direction of correlation between two ordinal variables. We first construct a transition matrix as follows: the wage distribution is divided into quintiles into both periods t and, which results in a 5×5 transition matrix from origin to destination. Origin quintiles (referring to the period $t-1$) are represented down the rows and destination (referring to the period t) across the columns. The resulting matrices for the periods 2006–2009; 2009–2012; 2012–2015; and 2013–2015 are shown as plots in the 5th section. Finally, we apply Kendall's tau-b to each of these matrices to investigate relative social mobility patterns over time. Kendall's tau-b varies between −1 and +1, where −1 indicates a perfect independency between periods and +1 perfect dependency (see Houle 2019 for a more detailed discussion). Therefore, positive values point to a degree of social immobility, and we take 1-(tau-b) as our measure of social mobility.

When analysing social mobility dynamics at the regional level, we estimate the indices by twelve Turkish regions (NUTS1 regions defined by the EU). In this way, we obtain a social mobility measure for each region, which allows observing heterogeneity in social mobility among different parts of Turkey. Note that income ranks and transition matrices are computed with respect to the national income distribution and not at the regional scale following Chetty et al. (2014).

The relationship between pro-status quo mobilization and social mobility is a complex one. An appropriate model has to exploit the socio-economic variables at the individual level, and social mobility is a regional measure. This means that we need to specify a model with a hierarchical structure. Multilevel models allow us to study the variation at different scales simultaneously. These models improve the analyses, especially when the research question relates to more than one level and when observations are clustered under a theorized higher level; in such cases, conventional models underestimate standard errors and overestimate test statistics (Snijders and Bosker 1999). The multilevel approach has become common practice in various disciplines, especially when the explanatory power of a model is assumed to differ between hierarchical levels (Raudenbush and Willams 1995) and when single-level models show spatial autocorrelation problems (Türk and Östh 2019). Moreover, even though we use two individual-level datasets, social mobility measures are aggregated at a regional scale. In a single level setting, this would potentially lead to the so-called ecological fallacy. However, multilevel models accommodate spatial dependencies by differentiating within-level errors from between-level errors and estimated standard errors of the regression slopes correct for the dependency. Subramanian et al. (2009) demonstrate the benefits of using multilevel models to counteract the ecological fallacy.

In particular, using a multilevel framework allows us to study mass mobilization both with individual level and regional fixed effects and regional random effects simultaneously. Following the theoretical contribution of the paper, we specify a logistic regression with the multilevel structure as follows:

$$Logit\left(\Pr\left(M_{ij}=1\right)\right)=\beta_0+\beta_{ij}x+\beta_j r+u_j \qquad \text{(Eq.2)}$$

where M_{ij} is a binary response variable $M_{ij}=1$ denoting mobilization (the alternative is failure to do so $M_{ij}=0$) of an individual i who lives in region j and $\Pr\left(M_{ij}=1\right)$ is the probability of mobilization to protect the status quo. β_0 is the overall mean probability expressed on the logistic scale, x includes all the individual-specific covariates such as income, gender, age and ethnicity and β_{ij} are associated coefficients. The vector r denotes all regional-specific characteristics such as social mobility at the regional level and the inequality measure, and finally β_j and u_j are regional specific coefficients and area-level residuals, respectively. Income represents the extent to which past expectations of well-being are fulfilled and the opportunity cost of violence for an individual (Parvin 1973). The following section presents the model output and results for different specifications of social mobility and regional characteristics.

Multilevel models have a useful feature that allows for partitioning the total variance into the first and second level variances. The intraclass correlation coefficient permits for an assessment of relative variability of response variable at the group level (Snijders and

Bosker 1999) and the median odds ratio (MOR) converts the second level variance into odds ratio scale (Merlo et al. 2006)[3]. Both ICC and MOR measure the influence regions on the likelihood of mobilization.

5. Empirical findings

In this section, we present outputs from the multilevel logistic regressions. First, we begin with discussing the results at the individual level and conclude with regional level findings.

5.1 Socio-economic factors and social mobility at the individual level

Multilevel modelling often begins with a so-called null model, wherein only the grand mean is fit with random effects and without any predictors. The null model shown in the first column of Table 4 will be helpful at the end of this section when we discuss variance partition between two levels. Table 4 reports our multilevel analysis on the likelihood of mobilization and a set of explanatory variables.Tables 2Table 3

The variable *income* is an indicator that measures absolute earnings (as specified by the logarithm of monthly income) and shows a positive and significant effect on the outcome variable. We find that the likelihood PGMs increases with income. As Parvin (1973) argues, the current income level represents the degree to which past expectations are fulfilled. Therefore, relatively higher incomes (compared to poorer segments of the society) might provide individuals with expectations of securing a better social position in the future, and thus they would be more likely to anticipate upward mobility. Hence, they might prefer the status quo to an uncertain economic future. A similar finding yields when we consider the highest educational attainment. Having at least a middle school or a high school diploma was associated with a greater tendency to protect the system, and again, ceteris paribus, this might relate to expectations of future upward social mobility. For highly educated individuals, the coefficient is positive but not significant. This might point to political orientation. Previous surveys have shown a tendency to align with the opposition among university graduates in Turkey.

The other control variables indicate that the male population is more likely to attend PGMs. From a social mobility perspective, this is in line with and, wherein social mobility measures indicate that the male population is more likely to experience upward social mobility. The variable *Age* shows that the older the person, the lower the probability of mobilization. As a general principle of collective action, participants of violent protests are young adults, but also individuals who are close to the retirement age have lesser expectations of social mobility from the system. The model output shows that ethnicity is

Table 2. Kendall's tau-b Relative Social Mobility Measures (1-tau): four-year interval for whole sample, male, female.

Period	2006–2009	2009–2012	2012–2015	2013–2016
ALL	0.4071	0.3238	0.3488	0.3390
MALE	0.4237	0.3472	0.3689	0.3652
FEMALE	0.3619	0.2643	0.3127	0.2972
OBSERVATIONS	1,470	1,806	3,542	3,533

Table 3. Rank-Rank Slope Social Mobility Measures (1-β): four-year intervals whole sample and male-female population.

Period	2006–2009	2009–2012	2012–2015	2013–2016
ALL	0.3014	0.2185	0.2450	0.2258
MALE	0.3301	0.2504	0.2729	0.2593
FEMALE	0.2201	0.1283	0.1924	0.1621
OBSERVATIONS	1,470	1,806	3,542	3,533

not a significant determinant of mobilization. However, the coefficients for Kurdish people are negative. Participation of Kurdish citizens in the PGM seems unlikely, as the coup attempt coincided with the end of peace talks and the return of violent conflict between Kurdish separatist groups and the Turkish security forces. This is also our finding for the political party choice and the likelihood of mobilization. While AKP and MHP demonstrate the highest participation rates, having voted for CHP and HDP in the elections prior to the coup attempt is associated with a lesser likelihood of participating in the PGMs. This is expected, as identification with the ruling party's ideology increases defensive attitude towards it. Finally, Table 4 shows that the variable *Lifestyle* is not statistically significant for all the models. However, it is important to note that the variable *Political Party* might be picking up much of the variation in relation to lifestyle.

5.2 Social mobility at the regional level

In this section, we conduct a correlation analysis between the likelihood of PGMs and regional level social mobility. Social mobility is measured at the regional scale, and there are 12 such regions with pre-determined boundaries in Turkey. We are aware that these are large macro-scale regions. However, finer resolution geography is not available in our dataset and, in general, for Turkey. Therefore, the following analyses are not meant to provide causality but simply refer to correlations.

Concerning the institutional factors and social mobility, we include a set of economic variables at the regional scale where individuals live and potentially acted as vigilantes on the night of July 15th. Table 4 shows the output of multilevel logistic regressions with the following variables at the regional level: social mobility as measured by rank-rank slope (Model I) and Kendall's tau-b (Model II); inequality as measured by the Gini index of income inequality; GDP per capita; unemployment, and finally population in each region.

Table 4 shows that in all models, social mobility is associated with a higher tendency to mobilize. In Model I, social mobility is computed by rank-rank slope coefficient and indicates that people living in regions with high social mobility are more likely to engage in PGMs. The model includes regional unemployment levels and GDP per capita as other economic variables, where the former has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, whereas the latter shows a positive but not significant effect on mobilization. Note that the rank-rank slope is a relative social mobility measure so that the movements along the 4-year window occur between percentile ranks, and, for an individual to move up in rank, someone else must lose their position. This means that high relative social mobility also points to high volatility in both directions of mobility in a given region. This finding

Table 4. Multilevel Logistic Regression outputs. Table reports the variables at the individual level for 4 models with different social mobility measures.

	Model (Null)	Model (I)	Model (II)	Model(III)
	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES				
MALE		1.217***	1.191***	1.205***
		(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.113)
AGE		−0.015***	−0.014***	−0.015***
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
INCOME		0.476***	0.354***	0.364***
		(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.104)
EDUCATION (REF. PRIMARY SCHOOL)				
MIDDLE SCHOOL		0.510*	0.515*	0.464*
		(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.245)
HIGH SCHOOL		0.597*	0.541*	0.535*
		(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.273)
AT LEAST UNIVERSITY		0.466	0.477	0.468
		(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.299)
LIFE STYLE (REF. MODERN)				
TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE		0.018	0.020	0.079
		(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.143)
RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE		0.011	0.018	0.019
		(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.174)
ETHNICITY (REF. TURK)				
KURD		−0.015	−0.049	−0.049
		(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.181)
ARAB		0.219	0.263	0.265
		(0.349)	(0.345)	(0.345)
POLITICAL PARTY (ABSENTEE)				
AKP		1.583***	1.734***	1.647***
		(0.226)	(0.235)	(0.242)
CHP		−0.165	−0.021	−0.166
		(0.265)	(0.267)	(0.278)
MHP		1.354***	1.218***	1.141***
		(0.275)	(0.280)	(0.289)
HDP		−0.917*	−0.777*	−0.917**
		(0.415)	(0.410)	(0.428)
HESITANT		0.441*	0.450*	0.456*
		(0.248)	(0.252)	(0.259)
REGIONAL EFFECTS				
SOCIAL MOBILITY		5.109**		6.660***
		(2.164)		(2.038)
SOCIAL MOBILITY 2			8.785**	
			(3.503)	
GINI				−0.341**
				(0.150)
UNEMPLOYMENT		−0.135***	−0.240*	−0.419***
		(0.057)	(0.103)	(0.132)
GDP		1.197	0.931	9.107**
		(2.620)	(2.611)	(3.801)
POPULATION		0.000	0.000	0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
VARIANCE (REGIONAL LEVEL)	0.556	0.106	0.097	0.050
	(0.262)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.041)
OBSERVATIONS	1,995	1,995	1,995	1,995
LOG LIKELIHOOD	−1560.0214	−1174.6093	−1089.5457	−1088.0329
NUMBER OF GROUPS	12	12	12	12
CHIBAR2(01)	150.06	21.04	19.80	5.61
PROB>CHIBAR2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
ICC	0.145	0.033	0.027	0.008
MOR	2.037	1.375	1.333	1.168

aligns with Acemoğlu and Robinson (2011), who argue that the middle classes are less likely to embrace political change if they enjoy a sufficient degree of social mobility. In Model II, we observe the same relationship by employing Kendall's tau-b as the measure of social mobility at the regional level. Therefore, the correlation between PGM and social mobility is robust across different measures and model specifications. When we add the Gini index in Model III, we find that unemployment and inequality are negatively and significantly associated with the probability of PGM. To some extent, this result differs from the earlier findings, wherein inequality was not seen to impact certain types of political instability. For instance, Houle (2019) argues that the fraction of political instability due to inequality might be attributable to social immobility. In the case of a PGM, however, even if we employ both social mobility and inequality in the model, the two indices remain statistically significant with opposite coefficient signs. This finding might relate to perceptions of inequality in Turkey. Even though consumption inequality has decreased by ten percent in the country between 2003 and 2006, 85% of the respondents of a public survey still perceived a large gap between the poor and the rich (Life in Transition Survey, 2006). This implies that if inequality and social mobility influence people's judgements of social fairness, both correlate with PGM.

Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of PGM in relation to social mobility as defined in the referred models. The positive and significant relationship between the two can be seen in each graph. The first graph indicates that a very high regional social mobility (as measured by rank-rank correlation coefficient) in a region is associated with



Figure 1. The relationship between the predicted probabilities of PGM and social mobility, 90% confidence intervals are represented by the shaded area.

0.55 as the probability of mobilization with mean effects of control variables. Similarly, the second graph indicates a mobilization probability of 0.65 for a region with a very high social mobility level as measured by Kendall's tau-b. The third graph shows the relationship between predicted PGM probabilities and social mobility for the last model, including the Gini coefficient. In this graph, again, the likelihood of mobilization increases with social mobility at degrees similar to those in the first graph.

Table 4 shows that political party choice has been one of the strongest predictors of the PGM. We have also interacted our social mobility measure with the variable indicating political party choice. Since AKP supporters might have benefited from the current government in terms of general improvement in social mobility and through channels of clientelism (including in-kind payments and welfare programmes)[4], we expect a significant interaction effect. Indeed Figure 2 suggests that irrespective of the regional social mobility level, AKP supporters show a higher likelihood of PGMs and at very high levels of regional social mobility -ceteris paribus- the probability reaches 0.7. MHP supporters show a similar trend. The leader of MHP was first to give a statement against the coup attempt. We believe this was well responded to by their supporters. We also see a ranking of the supporters of the political parties, where HDP and CHP show the least likelihood of PGM while increasing with regional social mobility. It is worth noting that our results do not attribute greater importance to social mobility when compared with ideological factors. Indeed, the interaction between political party choice and regional social mobility suggests that AKP and MHP supporters had a higher tendency to



Figure 2. Predicted probability of PGM. The model interacts political choice and regional social mobility.

mobilize than HDP and CHP, irrespective of the level of regional social mobility. But we also observe that exposure to upward social mobility at the regional level might be a factor that induces people to attend PGMs, even for those who support opposition parties.

Finally, we report regional-level variances, ICC, and MOR results below each model. The unexplained variance at the second level considerably declines from the null model to the full models (I, II, and III). In particular, the inclusion of regional specific variables explains 80% of the regional variance. Similarly, the ICCs indicate a 14% variance attributable to the regional effects in the null model. In models I, II and III, the ICCs show approximately 3% variation in the likelihood of mobilization at the regional level. The ICC declines 13 percentage points from the null model to the full. This means that we can explain most of the variation in the likelihood of mobilization among regions by social mobility and other economic variables specified in the multilevel model. Finally, the MORs provide us with further useful information, suggesting increased (median) odds of mobilization if individual moves to a region with higher social mobility. The null model shows a MOR measure of 2.037, and this decreases to 1.168 in Model III. Therefore, we can conclude that an individual living in a region with high social mobility, less inequality and unemployment and higher GDP is 1.168 times more likely to take to the streets in defence of the regime. However, further analysis with more finely grained geographical definitions could refine the results and provide more precise estimates.

5.3 Sensitivity analysis

We conduct several sensitivity analyses by first altering the definition of PGM and then by varying those populations included in our models. Appendix Table A1 consists of the summary outputs for the three models.

In the previous models, we examined the likelihood of PGM occurring on the night of 15 July 2016. The participants were protesting against an immediate threat to the elected government and engaged in violent confrontations in some cases. Therefore, our definition of PGM was an immediate reaction to a threat to the system in the face of great risk and adversity. We specify an alternative dependent variable in the first model shown in Table A1, which addresses the likelihood of attending gatherings (known as the 'democracy watch') in the central squares of major cities in the days following the coup attempt. The new model employs a less restrictive definition of PGM, which also includes rallies and demonstrations in favour of preserving the status quo. As the first column of Table A1 shows, the results remain robust.

As in all surveys, one cannot be fully confident that our survey data conveys the true opinions of participants. However, the survey was conducted three weeks after the coup attempt, and, in this period, the regime was focused solely on rooting out the well-known Gülenist organizations. The ensuing conflict with the opposition parties and more generalized policies of suppression had not begun until a month and a half after the initial coup attempt. While we think the anonymity of the survey contributes to the authenticity of the replies and the timing strengthens the validity of our results, there are reasons why some of the respondents would have been reluctant to recount their true behaviour on the night of July 15th. Although the government pursued an inclusive strategy in the immediate aftermath of the coup – for instance,

by organizing a rally with all of the opposition leaders, the PDP was conspicuously absent. Moreover, as we stated earlier, the coup attempt coincided with the end of peace talks with Kurdish separatist groups and the return of violent conflicts with the security forces in Turkey. In the data survey, 10% of PDP supporters confirmed their presence in the protests. We use this percentage in our robustness checks and randomly drop 10% of the data. We then conduct a multilevel logistic regression with 100 bootstrap repetitions. As shown in the second column of Table A1, the results are unaltered.

In the third model, we adopt a more restrictive approach, randomly drop 30% of the data, and conduct analysis with 100 bootstrap repetitions. The percentage is the share of individuals who stated that they attended the protests on the night of July 15th and voted for parties other than the ruling party. The third column also shows that the findings remain valid.

In the final model, we add the variable *expectations* as a subjective measure of social mobility. The results indicate that individuals who expect better economic conditions in the future are more likely to attend PGMs with respect to those who expect worsening of the conditions. We acknowledge that the subjective measure of social mobility is not perfect, but regression outputs from the last model do support our previous findings.

6. Conclusions

This paper aimed at examining the economic determinants of PGM, using July 15th as the case study. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no body of literature that studies the occurrence of this rather unusual phenomenon by individual-level information and, in particular, in relation to well-known theories of social mobility. Scholars of political economy have asserted that higher upward social mobility is negatively correlated with political instability, while lower social mobility is more conducive to revolts, uprisings and civil wars. This article contributes to this literature by arguing that people who experience upward social mobility (in certain circumstances such as a sudden threat) could also be *more* likely to participate in protests in defence of the system. Our findings align with the dominant theories of regime transition (Baharoğlu 2005, 2013; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2001, 2016), which argue that people from all different classes act based on their social mobility expectations. The likelihood of regime support increases when economic growth and social mobility are rising and when there is an expectation of future increases.

Multilevel models involving two social mobility measures were employed to support the hypothesis that protest mobilization is higher in regions with higher social mobility. Specifically, the PGM probability of 0.59 is associated with a social mobility level of 0.50. Moreover, to test the relationship between inequality and PGM, we specified a multilevel model incorporating the Gini index of income inequality and unemployment at the regional level. The output from the regression shows that residents of those regions with higher income inequality and unemployment rates were less inclined to mobilize in defence of the system. Separate from previous studies of PGMs, we have employed individual-level data, which allows us to examine individual characteristics in relation to the likelihood of citizens attending PGMs. Our findings suggest that the tendency to

participate in street-level protests increases with income, which might be attributed to the positive relationship between absolute social mobility and PGMs. Furthermore, our analysis has shown that younger male high school graduates were more likely to take to the streets to protect the status quo.

The analysis carried out in the present study does not provide the final answer to many intriguing questions related to the phenomenon of PGMs, but it is our hope that it may open up future avenues for research in this area. First of all, further analyses would benefit from a finer geographical resolution in defining the social mobility within regions. Another critical point to note is that Turkey's economic distribution shows the characteristics of a developing country under a populist conservative party. This means that economic growth and income levels should be expected to expand more on average than developed countries, and also that the populist redistributive policies should provide some measure of relief for lower-income groups within the society. Future studies of this phenomenon would benefit from a more thoroughgoing engagement with the relationship between populist political party policies in developing countries and PGM, particularly given the increasing shift to authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governance.

Notes

1. The survey was conducted according to the most recent census track. See https://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/KONDA1608_15_TEMMUZ_DARBE_GIRISIMI.pdf
2. The data allows us to follow individuals in four-year intervals, for instance 2006–2009; 2009–2012; 2012–2015. Each year refers to earnings in the previous year and 75% of the previous respondents are kept as cycles.
3. The ICC is defined as: $ICC = \frac{\tau_{00}}{\tau_{00}+\pi^2/3}$ where τ_{00} is the variance at the group level, and $\pi^2/3$ is the variance of level-one residuals. The MOR is calculated as follows: $MOR = \exp\left(\sqrt{2}\tau_{00}.\phi^{-1}(0.75)\right)$ where τ_{00} is variance at the group level, ϕ^{-1} denotes the inverse of the 75^{th} centile of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
4. We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd received her PhD from Political Science department, McMaster University. She is currently working at Abdullah GÜl University Political Science and International Relations Department. Her research focuses on global migration, gender and social movements.

Umut Türk is currently working at the department of Economics, Abdullah Gül University, Turkey. He has extensively worked on the topics of (i) spatial economics (ii) regional science (iii) inequality of opportunity (iv) accessibility (v) social mobility and vi) tourism. He is particularly interested in geographical influences in distributional concerns.

Rasim Özgür Dönmez is the dean of faculty of humanities and social sciences at Abdullah Gül University. His research and teaching interests are identity politics, political violence and social movements. He is the founder and the editor of political science journal Alternative Politics-Alternatif Politika. He prepared and contributed to some TV shows.

ORCID

Fatma Armağan Teke-Lloyd http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5439-439X
Umut Türk http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8440-7048
Rasim Özgür Dönmez http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9001-2990

References

Acemoğlu, D., and J.A. Robinson. 2001. A theory of political transitions. *American Economic Review* 91, no. 4: 938–63. doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.938.

Acemoğlu, D. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Robinson , J.A. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Ansell, B., and D. Samuels. 2010. Inequality and democratization: A contractarian approach. *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 12: 1543–74. doi:10.1177/0010414010376915.

Bahçe, S., and A. Köse. 2017. Social classes and the neo-liberal poverty regime in Turkey, 2002–2011. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47, no. 4: 575–95. doi:10.1080/00472336.2017.1325919.

Bai, Y., and R. Jia. 2016. Elite recruitment and political stability. *Econometrica* 84, no. 2: 677–733. doi:10.3982/ECTA13448.

Barber, J.A. 1970. *Social mobility and voting behavior*. Illinois: Rand McNally.

Benabou, R., and E.A. Ok. 2001. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The POUM hypothesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116, no. 2: 447–87. doi:10.1162/00335530151144078.

Bozkurt, U. 2013. Neoliberalism with a human face: Making sense of the justice and development party's neoliberal populism in Turkey. *Science and Society* 77, no. 3: 372–96. doi:10.1521/siso.2013.77.3.372.

Chetty, R., N. Hendren, P. Kline, and E. Saez. 2014. Where is the land of opportunity? The geography of intergenerational mobility in the United States. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129, no. 4: 1553–623. doi:10.1093/qje/qju022.

Çınar, M. 2018. From moderation to de-moderation: Democratic backsliding of the AKP in Turkey. In *The politics of Islamism*, ed. J. Esposito, L. Rahim, and N. Ghobadzadeh, 127–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Day, M.V., and S.T. Fiske. 2017. Movin'on up? How perceptions of social mobility affect our willingness to defend the system. *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 8, no. 3: 267–74. doi:10.1177/1948550616678454.

De Graaf, N.D., P. Nieuwbeerta, and A. Heath. 1995. Class mobility and political preferences: Individual and contextual effects. *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 4: 997–1027. doi:10.1086/230607.

Del Sordi, A. 2018. Sponsoring student mobility for development and authoritarian stability: Kazakhastan'sBolashak programme. *Globalization* 15, no. 2: 215–31. doi:10.1080/14747731.2017.1403780.

Dönmez , R.Ö., Timur, K, and Lloyd, F.A.T 2020 The Nexus of Leadership, Political Empowerment and Social Mobilization *Insight Turkey* 22, no. 2: 151–176. doi:10.25253/99.2020222.10

Finkel, S.E., E.N. Muller, and M.A. Seligson. 1989. Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support: A comparison of longitudinal data from West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 3: 329–51. doi:10.1017/S0007123400005512.

Gandhi, J., and A. Przeworski. 2007. Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11: 1279–301. doi:10.1177/0010414007305817.
Geddes B and Zaller J. (1989). Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(2), 319 doi: 10.2307/2111150
Geddes, B. 2000. Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game-theoretic argument. Unpublished manuscript, University of California at Los Angeles.
Gray, J. 2003. *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern*. London: Faber and Faber.
Greene, S., and G. Robertson. 2017. Agreeable authoritarians: Personality and politics in contemporary Russia. *Comparative Political Studies* 50, no. 13: 1802–34. doi:10.1177/0010414016688005.
Gülalp, H. AKP's Conservative Democracy: A Post-Kemalist Liberalism?. In annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, USA.
Gumuscu S and Sert D. (2009). The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(6), 953–968. doi: 10.1080/00263200903268710
Hellmeier, S., and N.B. Weidmann. 2020. Pulling the strings? The strategic use of pro-government mobilization in authoritarian regimes. *Comparative Political Studies* 53, no. 1: 71–108. doi:10.1177/0010414019843559.
Houle, C. 2019. Social mobility and political instability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 1: 85–111. doi:10.1177/0022002717723434.
I Miquel, P.G. 2007. The control of politicians in divided societies: The politics of fear. *The Review of Economic Studies* 74, no. 4: 1259–74. doi:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00455.x.
Jones D Martin. (1998). Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 147 doi: 10.2307/422285.
KONDA, Reserach and Consultancey Agency. 2016. 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi, KONDA Barometresi Temalar.
Leventoğlu B. (2005). Social Mobility and Political Transitions. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 17 (4), 465–496. doi: 10.1177/0951629805056897.
Leventoğlu, B. 2014. Social mobility, middle class and political transitions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 5: 825–64. doi:10.1177/0022002713478563.
Linz, J.J. 2000 *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Linz, J.J. *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Malik, A., and B. Awadallah. 2013. The economics of the Arab Spring. *World Development* 45: 296–313. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.015.
McCarthy J D and Zald M N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212–1241. 10.1086/226464.
Merlo, J., B. Chaix, H. Ohlsson, A. Beckman, K. Johnell, P. Hjerpe, and K. Larsen. 2006. A brief conceptual tutorial of multilevel analysis in social epidemiology: Using measures of clustering in multilevel logistic regression to investigate contextual phenomena. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 60, no. 4: 290–97. doi:10.1136/jech.2004.029454.
Michelangeli A and Türk U. (2021). Cities as drivers of social mobility. *Cities*, 108 102969 doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2020.102969.
Miş, N. 2016. Measuring Social Perception of the July 15 Coup Attempt. *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 3: 169–204.
Öniş, Z. 2012. The triumph of conservative globalism: The political economy of the AKP Era. *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 2: 135–52. doi:10.1080/14683849.2012.685252.
Parvin, M. 1973. Economic determinants of political unrest: An econometric approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17, no. 2: 271–96. doi:10.1177/002200277301700205.
Piketty T. (2005). Top Income Shares in the Long Run: An Overview. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2–3), 382–392. doi: 10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.382
Rashiduzzaman, M. 1997. Political unrest and democracy in Bangladesh. *Asian Survey* 37, no. 3: 254–68. doi:10.2307/2645662.
Raudenbush, S.W., and J. Willams. 1995. The estimation of school effects. *Journal Of Educational And Behavioral Statistics* 20, no. 4: 307–35. doi:10.3102/10769986020004307.

Roe, M., and J. Siegel. 2011. Political Instability. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 39, no. 3: 279–309. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.02.001.
Rosendorff, P. 2001. Choosing Democracy. *Economics and Politics* 13, no. 1: 1–29. doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00081.
Smyth, R., A. Sobolev, and I. Soboleva. 2013. *Patterns of discontent: Identifying the participant core in Russian post-election protest*. Conference Russia's Winter of Discontent: Taking Stock of Changing State-Society Relationships, Uppsala University, September, 6–7.
Snijders, T., and R. Bosker. 1999. *Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and applied multilevel analysis*. Los Angeles: Sage.
Solon, G. 1999. Intergenerational mobility in the labor market. In *Handbook of labor economics*, ed. D. Card and O. Ashenfelter, 1761–800. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Subramanian, S.V., K. Jones, A. Kaddour, and N. Krieger. 2009. Revisiting Robinson: The perils of individualistic and ecologic fallacy. *International Journal of Epidemiology* 38, no. 2: 342–60. doi:10.1093/ije/dyn359.
Susánszky, P., A. Kopper, and G. Tóth. 2016. Pro-government demonstrations in Hungary—citizens autonomy and the role of the media. *East European Politics* 32, no. 1: 63–80. doi:10.1080/21599165.2015.1128900.
Tobin, S. 2012. Jordan's Arab Spring: The middle class and anti-revolution. *Middle East Policy* XIX, no. 1: 96–109. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00526.x.
Türk, U., and J. Östh. 2019. How much does geography contribute? Measuring inequality of opportunities using a bespoke neighbourhood approach. *Journal of Geographical Systems* 21, no. 2: 295–318. doi:10.1007/s10109-019-00297-z.
TurkStat. 2016. *Income and living conditions survey*. Ankara, Turkey: TurkStat.
Ünver, H.A., and H., Alassaad. 14 September 2016. How Turks Mobilized Against the Coup. *Foreing Affairs*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-14/how-turks-mobilized-against-coup Accessed18 01 2020
Weakliem, D.L. 1992. Does social mobility affect political behaviour? *European Sociological Review* 8, no. 2: 153–65. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036629.
White, J. 2012. Islamist social networks and social welfare services in Turkey. In *Islamist politics in the middle east*, ed. S. Shehata, 3–81. New York: Routledg.
World Bank, 2014 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TR Accessed 13 04 2020
Wright J and Escribà-Folch A. (2012). Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy. Brit. J. Polit. Sci., 42(2), 283–309. 10.1017/S0007123411000317
Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu,. 2019. Ankara, Turkey: YÖK.

Appendix

Table A1. Sensitivity analysis with different model specifications.

	Model (I)	Model (II)	Model(III)	Model (IV)
	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)	Coeff. (Std. Err.)
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES				
MALE	0.993***	1.205***	1.206***	1.217***
	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.147)	(0.117)
AGE	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.015***	−0.015***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
INCOME	0.371***	0.363***	0.364***	0.339***
	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.145)	(0.107)
EDUCATION (REF. PRIMARY SCHOOL)				
MIDDLE SCHOOL	0.287	0.464*	0.464	0.434
	(0.214)	(0.267)	(0.348)	(0.249)
HIGH SCHOOL	0.379	0.535*	0.536	0.511*
	(0.241)	(0.298)	(0.389)	(0.275)
AT LEAST UNIVERSITY	0.323	0.468	0.468	0.535
	(0.267)	(0312)	(0.417)	(0.310)
LIFE STYLE (REF. MODERN)				
TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE	0.122	0.079	0.079	0.124
	(0.131)	(0.145)	(0.167)	(0.149
RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE	0.035	0.019	0.019	0.063
	(0.161)	(0.181)	(0.204)	(0.181)
ETHNICITY (REF. TURK)				
KURD	−0.110	−0.046	−0.047	−0.026
	(0.168)	(0.186)	(0.241)	(0.175)
ARAB	0.031	0.265	0.266	0.581
	(0.925)	(0.494)	(0.435)	(0.377)
POLITICAL PARTY (ABSENTEE)				
AKP	1.710***	1.141***	1.651***	1.654***
	(0.226)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.256)
CHP	0.092	−0.166	−0.166	−0.093
	(0.254)	(0.306)	(0.378)	(0.295)
MHP	1.381***	1.141***	1.141***	1.196***
	(0.270)	(0.310)	(0.416)	(0.304)
HDP	−0.955**	−0.918*	−0.918	−0.727
	(0.405)	(0.529)	(0.681)	(0.436)
HESITANT	0.678***	0.457*	0.457	0.571*
	(0.241)	(0.264)	(0.344)	(0.274)
EXPECTATIONS (NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS)				
POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS				0.637***
				(0.161)
NO CHANGE EXPECTED				0.091
				(0.127)
REGIONAL EFFECTS				
SOCIAL MOBILITY	3.675**	6.660***	6.660***	5.036***
	(1.750)	(1.744)	(2.340)	(2.270)
GINI	−0.293**	−0.342***	−0.342**	−0.338**
	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.158)	(0.158)
UNEMPLOYMENT	−0.130***	−0.418***	−0.417***	−0.687***
	(0.057)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(2.17)
GDP	8.129**	9.108***	9.107**	9.193**
	(3.234)	(3015)	(3.595)	(3.987)
POPULATION	0.000***	0.000	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
VARIANCE (REGIONAL LEVEL)	0.035	0.050	0.050	0.017
	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.013)
OBSERVATIONS	1,995	1,975	1,396	1,995
LOG LIKELIHOOD	−1265.3908	−1089.5457	−1088.0329	−1020.234
NUMBER OF GROUPS	12	12	12	12
PROB>CHIBAR2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000